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PUTTING HUMPTY DUMPTY BACK TOGETHER:
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE OF ANTICOMMONS
TRAGEDIES
Ben Depoorter& Sven Vanneste*

ABSTRACT

This Article conducts an experimental investigation of anticommons
dilemmas. The results confirm that anticommons deadweight losses
increase with the degree of complementarity and the degree of
fragmentation of property. Our study further provides three novel insights
into the problem of fragmentation. First, the data illustrates that individual
right holders ignore the expected value of bundling and instead focus on the
maximum profit he or she could realize by bundling. Second, the
experiments suggest that uncertainty amplifies the anticommons pricing
effect. Finally, cooperation is higher in cases where the value of bundling
is more uncertain as opposed to scenarios where there is relative certainty
of creating surplus but there is a (modest) chance of losses from bundling.
1.

INTRODUCTION

An anticommons is a property regime in which multiple owners hold
effective rights of exclusion in a scarce resource.' Economic theory has
illustrated how the coexistence of multiple exclusion rights may lead to
sub-optimal uses of resources held in common. 2 If a common resource is
*

Ben Depoorter is associate professor at University of Miami School of Law and Ghent

University Law School. Sven Vanneste is research fellow at Ghent University, Faculty of Psychology,
Dept. of Developmental, Personality & Social Psychology and visiting scholar Ghent University School
of Law, Center for Advanced Studies in Law and Economics.
1 This definition of the anticommons, employed by Heller, provides a powerful tool for property
theory. Heller first revitalized the concept in an article on the transition to market institutions in
contemporary Russia. He discusses the intriguing prevalence of empty storefronts in Moscow.
Storefronts in Moscow are subject to under use because there are too many owners (local, regional and
federal government agencies, mafia, etc.) holding the right to exclude. See Michael A. Heller, The
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transitionfrom Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REv. 621
(1998). The title of this paper refers to the fairy tale of Humpty Dumpty to illustrate the anticommons.
When Humpty Dumpty is shattered into pieces all of the king's horses and all of the king's men cannot
re-assemble him, which stands in contrast to the ease with which he broke into pieces in the first place.
See Michael A. Heller, The Boundariesof Private Property, 108 YALE L. J. 1163 (1999).
2 Anticommons theory relies on Cournot's model of duopoly: a single monopolist producing a
composite good will charge a price lower than the sum of the prices that would be charged by two
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subject to multiple exclusion rights held by two or more individuals, each
co-owner has incentives to withhold resources from other users to an
inefficient level. As a result, exclusion rights will be exercised even when
the use of the common resource by one party could yield net social benefits,
a problem known as the "Tragedy of the Anticommons." 3 Take the
example of medical innovation. It is generally understood that awarding
private property rights to discoveries promotes innovation and the
In light of the
commercial development of new technologies. 4
anticommons, intellectual property rights to research may actually retard
life-saving developments of medical products when each owner of various
stages of research block each other from the use of his research in creating
these products. 5 The tragedy of the anticommons may occur because the
multiple holders of exclusion rights do not fully internalize the cost created
by the enforcement of their right to exclude others.6
The intuition underlying the anticommons is that it is often harder to
regenerate separated bundles than it is to fragmentize. 7 Economic models
assume the costs to rebundle independently-owned property fragments are
Such
higher than the costs involved in the initial fragmentation.
"stickiness" of fragmentation is problematic when the costs of bundling
prevent value-maximizing uses of the resource. When a value-enhancing
opportunity arises which requires the unification of each fragmented right,
the ex-ante rational decision to fragment may turn out to be ex-post sub-

complementary duopolists selling the single component parts. AUGUST COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO
THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH (1838).

The pioneering articles include: Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons, supra note 1; Heller,
The Boundaries of Private Property, supra note 1; Michael E. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. MAG. 698 (1998),
excerpted as Upstream Patents = Downstream Bottlenecks, 41 Law Quad. Notes, 93-7 (1998). The
concept of the tragedy of the anticommons was formalized in James Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon,
Symmetric Tragedies:Commons and Anticommons Property, 43 J. L. & ECON. 1, 1-13 (2000); Norbert
Schulz et al., Fragmentation in Property: Towards a General Model, 158 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 594 (2002); Francesco Parisi, et al., Duality in Property: Commons and
Anticommons, 25 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 578 (2005).
4 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265
(1977).
5 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 698: "more intellectual property rights may lead
paradoxically to fewer useful products for improving human health." For an empirical investigation, see
John P. Walsh et al., Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCI. MAG. 1021 (2003) (providing
survey evidence of the anticommons problem and the creativity of innovators in solving the problem).
6 But see, e.g., Richard A. Epstein & Bruce Kuhlik, Is there a Biomedical Anticommons?, 27
REG. 54 (2004) (arguing that researchers have ample incentives to solve anticommons problems in the
biomedical field).
7 In the words of Heller: "Once an anticommons emerges, collecting rights into usable private
property may prove to be brutal and slow." Michael A. Heller, Three Facesof PrivateProperty, 79 OR.
L. REV. 417, 418, 424 (2000).
3
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optimal, given the greater costs of reunification.' Prior theoretical research
on anticommons fragmentation further suggests that the severity of the
deadweight losses from concurrent possession of a complementary right
increases monotonically with the number of independent holders.9
Despite these theoretical underpinnings, the literature to date has
omitted analysis of the precise factors that lead reunification efforts to fail.
Are negotiations unsuccessful because of transaction costs and strategic
behavior, or is the bargaining process troubled by cognitive error? What
social and cognitive processes lie at the root of the anticommons problem?
In what way does non-cooperation in anticommons dilemmas differ from
the well-known tragedy of the commons? Because empirical evidence on
anticommons tragedies is hard to obtain directly," analysis of the processes
that create anticommons tragedies is especially important.
This Article sets out to deepen our understanding of the anticommons
problem by conducting a number of social dilemma experiments in a
laboratory setting. We measure the impact of various aspects of property
fragmentation and provide an interpretation of the social and cognitive
processes that might cause problems of reunification. We examine a
number of alleged attributing factors of anticommons tragedies that have
been highlighted in the theoretical literature." These factors include the
complementarity of fragmented parts, the number of fragmented parts, and
the degree of uncertainty in obtaining value from rebundling fragmented
ownership.
The results confirm the theoretical proposition that anticommons
deadweight losses increase with the degree of complementarity between
individual parts and with the degree of fragmentation. Our study further
provides three novel insights into the problem of fragmentation. First, the
data illustrates that each individual right holder ignores the expected value
of the purchaser's project, and instead focuses on the maximum profit he
could possibly realize by bundling. Second, the experiments suggest
uncertainty amplifies the anticommons pricing effect. Finally, cooperation
is higher in cases when the value of bundling is more uncertain, as opposed
8 Schulz et al., Fragmentationin Property: Towards a General Model, supra note 3.
9 Ben Depoorter & Francesco Parisi, Fair Use and Copyright Protection: A Price Theory
Explanation, 21 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 453, 460-61 (2002): "The greater the number of individuals
who can independently price an essential input, the higher the equilibrium price that each of these
individuals will demand for his own license. At the margin, as the number of [right] holders approaches
very large numbers (or infinity), complete abandonment of valuable resources will result."
10 Underuse and missed opportunities are not as easily observed as are, for instance, visually
apparent commons tragedies of overuse. Evidence of anticommons tragedies, for instance, of research
avenues forsaken due to licensing bottlenecks, must be observed indirectly through survey evidence.
For an example of empirical research on anticommons tragedies in the biomedical field, see Cohen et
al., supra note 5.
11 Heller, supra note 7, at 4. See also Parisi et al., Duality in Property: Commons and
Anticommons, supranote 3.
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to scenarios where there is a relative certainty of creating surplus but a
(modest) chance of loss from bundling.
Our experiment demonstrates the burden of negotiation that rests with
a buyer who seeks to rebundle independently-owned property fragments.
The results indicate the price concessions a prospective seller will need to
obtain to bring the price of bundling within the limits of the net expected
value of bundling.
Section 2 describes the structure of the experiment. Section 3 presents
the results of our experiment. Section 4 provides a discussion of the results.
Section 5 summarizes our conclusions.
2.

DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY

An anticommons is characterized by a conflict between private
incentives of the various right holders and their common interest. Although
an individual right holder should take into account the cross-effects of his
pricing decision in order to safeguard successful reunification, he has a
conflicting incentive to try and obtain as much as possible from the surplus
that results from the process of bundling the individual parts. This
divergence between private and public interests creates the "social
dilemma" that lies at the heart of anticommons regimes. 2
In our experiment, each participant 3 was informed in a script that he
or she was one of five partial right-holders (owners) to a unitary resource. 4
In each of the scenarios, participants were informed that a third-party was
looking to purchase a number of parts under the terms described in the
particulars of the sub-experiment. Each participant further learned that he
possessed an individual piece of land worth fifty chips (each chip being the
equivalent of .05 euros), which he could cash in at the end of the
experiment in return for his right. If he sold his individual right in return
for chips from the bundler-purchaser, he would be able to return these chips
at the end of the experiment for the money equivalent. After explaining the
scenario, some comprehension questions were asked to verify that
participants understood the situation. All participants answered these
questions correctly.

12 In a social dilemma: (1) a non-cooperative choice is always more profitable to the individual
than a cooperative choice, regardless of the cooperativeness of others; (2) a non-cooperative choice is
always harmful to others compared to a cooperative choice; and (3) the aggregate amount of harm done
to others by a non-cooperative choice is greater than the individual's profit. See SHiRLI KOPELMAN Er
AL. FactorsInfluencing CooperationIn Commons Dilemmas: A Review Of ExperimentalPsychological
Research, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS, 113-156 (Elinor Ostrom et al. eds., Nat'l Acad. Press
2002).
13 We surveyed 300 first-year undergraduate students at Ghent University in Belgium.
14 No significant effect was found for age or gender.
HeinOnline -- 3 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 4 2006-2007
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Using different scenarios for each participant, as described below, we
explore how respondents, as individual right-holders, demand different
prices when the following independent variables vary: 1) the degree of
complementarity among fragmented parts; 2) the number of other rights
holders with complementary rights to the resource; 3) the synergy resulting
from fragmentation; and 4) the degree of uncertainty of the surplus obtained
by bundling each of the individual rights.
The questions in the script were ordered randomly to avoid learning
experiences. 5 The experiments were conducted in various different rooms
to prevent participants from communicating or learning each other's
reservation prices. The experiment was designed to measure the statistical
data on a parametrical level, To this purpose, we used a multivariate
repeated measure ANOVA. 6 Two sub-experiments deviate from this
statistical method and were replaced by a one-way ANOVA to comply with
the between-subject measurement format. 7
3.

RESULTS

3.1. Surveys A and B: Complementarity
Each participant 8 was informed that he or she was one of five partial
right holders (owners) to a unitary resource. The participants were
informed that a third-party was looking to purchase a number of parts. In
the various parts of the test, the number of individual parts ranged between
2 and 5. Students were further informed that each individual part, by itself,
had a market value of 50 euros. 9 The aggregate value of the unified bundle
15

When all subjects receive the script with questions in the same order, the first trial could

influence their opinion in the second trial and so on. The learning effect is nullified when subjects
receive the scripts in random order.
16 This involves the application of the analysis of variance to data in which a single dependent
variable is measured on more than one occasion on the same subject. In the case of an orthogonal
factorial design, the method essentially combines, in a linear fashion, the information of the several
response variables in such away as to detect any existing treatment effects. See RICHARD A. JOHNSON,
& DEAN W. WICHERN, APPLIED MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS (5th ed. 1998).
17 Various groups of participants were assigned to the different variables (2, 3, 4, or 5 parts) and
every group had to decide on the price of the part assigned to them.
18 This study's population consists of a random group of first-year students of the departments of
law, political science, and economics at Ghent University. Each student was randomly assigned to one
of the experiments.
19 We operate from the stylized assumption that there is no difference between the market price of
each individual part and the subjective value to each of the owners. In other words, we control for any
idiosyncratic qualities of the parts or cognitive attachments to the parts, such as negative endowment
effects. The cognitive effects involved in the decision-making process of rebundling are explored
further on in this study.
HeinOnline -- 3 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 5 2006-2007
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was 250 euros. No further information on the incentives of the third-party
(such as profitability and synergies resulting from bundling) was disclosed
at this point. While this approach reduces the control of the experiment,
relative to the other treatments in the surveys described below, this scenario
is useful because it has more external validity by aligning more closely with
real life anticommons situations where a third party purchaser (such as an
oil company) tries to hide its identity or project in order to prevent inflation
of prices. In the first hypothetical scenario, each student was informed that
the purchaser sought to obtain 2 out of 5 parts that were divided among five
participants. In a subsequent condition, other participants were informed
that the purchaser needed to obtain 3, 4, or all 5 parts. In each of these
scenarios, each participant listed his reservation price' while attempting to
maximize his personal gain. The survey thus measures the differences in
reservation prices arising in situations involving varying degrees of
complementarity. Where the third party only looked to purchase two parts,
this represents a relative low degree of complementarity, or, conversely, a
case of relatively high substitutability. 1 By contrast, when the hypothetical
scenario indicates the third party needed to purchase all five parts, this is a
situation of perfect complementarity.
Parts

Mean

StandardDeviation

N

2
3
4
5

64.6
69.5
76.3
100.1

18.65
15.27
35.57
48.34

20
20
20
20

Table 1: Descriptive statistic, between subjects

Parts

Mean

StandardDeviation

2
3
4
5

67.4
72.6
80,2
107.1

19.57
26.38
36.12
57,99

Table 2: Descriptive statistic, within subjects (N = 20)

20 We employ the term 'reservation price' to denote the initial selling price, as stated by the
individual right holder. Strictly speaking this price is not necessarily a reservation price in that this
stated price is the lowest outcome a negotiator is willing to accept. However, because there are no
negotiations, we assume that initial right holders, in effect, will not accept an agreement that is below
the initial selling price.
21 See Depoorter & Parisi, supra note 9, at 460-61.
HeinOnline -- 3 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 6 2006-2007
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Figure]1:The mean demand pricefor the different partsmeasured between subjects (ANOVA, F(3,76)=
4.73, p <.01)

Table I and accompanying Figure I map the variation between mean
reservation prices.
The mean demand price in the case of low
complementarity was sixty-seven euros. The aggregate mean price was
thus 134 euros; a total of thirty-four price units above the objective value of
two combined parts. In the case of perfect complementarity, the mean
demand price was 100 euros, totaling a mean demand price of 500 euros for
the combined purchase of all individual parts. While reservation prices for
"2 out of 5 complementarity" totaled 34% over the objective value, a case
of perfect complementarity averaged a combined demand price that was
100% above the objective value. These simple findings confirm the
theoretical finding that reservation prices correlate with the strength of the
veto right into the successful bundling of the individual parts.
We repeated the same experiment, but measured repeatedly with the
same subjects in each of the different conditions (2, 3, 4, and 5 parts)
(between subjects). This measurement enabled us to verify whether
subjects reasoned differently when they were asked to list a price in just one
of the above scenarios, compared to situations where each individual
subject was asked to formulate prices for all of the scenarios (within
subjects) . 22 The results-see Table 2-significantly correspond with the
previously shown within-subject findings (Repeated Measure ANOVA,
F(3,17) = 5.42, p < .01).

22 Whe

an experiment is conducted "rithin subjects," every participant is assigned to all

treatments in a randomly selected order. In such experiment there is a risk that participants' selling
prices differs
according to the initial
scenario (assembly of 2,3,4,or 5 required parts) first
assigned to
them. Such bias could be attributed to the initial
scenarios working as a reference point inthe mind of
the participants. In such a case participants might not fully
focus on the amount of parts the third party
seeks to gather (degree of complementarity).
HeinOnline -- 3 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 7 2006-2007
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3.2. Survey C: Opportunity Costs
In Experiment C, we attached various degrees of profitability to the
effort of rebundling by the third party. We measured the impact on the
reservation prices of the individual right holders. As before, each
participant (N = 84) was one of five partial right holders (owners) to a
unitary resource. They were informed that a third-party was looking to
purchase all five parts held by the individual owners. Again, each
individual part had an objective value of fifty euros and the aggregate value
of the unified bundle was 250 euros. By explicitly assigning the value of
each right, we attempted to eliminate the "attribution effect" whereby each
person systematically overvalues the role of his right in the overall project.23
Contrary to surveys A and B, we disclosed the opportunity costs of the
third party upfront. Each participant was requested to state his demand
price in each of five hypothetical scenarios with varying profits to be
obtained by the third-party purchaser from bundling all five parts. In five
different scenarios, each participant was informed that bundling would
create a surplus for the third party of 100, 300, 500, 1000, or 10,000 euros.
These scenarios each represent different values resulting from reunification.
In the last hypothetical, the "sum is worth more than its parts" by 9,750
euros (10,000 - 250). In such a scenario, unsuccessful rebundling imposes
considerable deadweight losses-as higher valued uses are not
consummated. This situation represents a more significant anticommons
tragedy relative to the first hypothetical, where a modest 100 euros was at
stake in the effort to rebundle. Figure 2, plots the reservation prices in all
five instances of surplus profitability. The vertical axis marks the asking
price, expressed in relative amounts of the profits, or synergies of bundling.
The horizontal axis indicates the cases of a third party profit of 100, 300,
500, 1000, 10,000 euros respectively. As Figure 2 below indicates, there
was no significant difference (F(3,81) = 1.28, p = .168) between reservation
prices in the profit range between 300 and 10,000 euros; the average price
stated by each right holder was approximately 26% of the total value of the
surplus attained by bundling. In the case of a surplus of 10,000 euros, the
purchaser was faced with an aggregate mean asking price of 12,300 euros.
This price is 24.6% above the price that he or she can offer so that the
project remains profitable. Similarly, when the profit from bundling was a
23 The attribution bias holds that individuals systematically overvalue their assets and disparage
the claims of their co-right holders. See LEE Ross & CRAIG A. ANDERSON, Shortcomings in the
attributionprocess: On the Originsand Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURIsTIcs AND BIASES, 129-52 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1982). Heller and Eisenberg suggest that this particular cognitive bias explains bargaining
breakdowns in the biotechnology industry, where scientists tend to overvalue the importance of their
discoveries for the development of follow-up, aggregate inventions. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note
3, at 701.
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more modest 300 euros (plot 2 on graph 2, a median asking price was
26.6% or 79.8 euros per part), the combined reservation price was 399.
Thus, the difference between reservation prices in the surplus range of 300
and 10,000 is non-significant.

34

ca
-32

0

2

2

28CL20
co

20

surplus

Figure2: The degree of profitabilityfrom bundling offragmented property entitlements on the prices
chargedby individualtight holders (F(4, 80) = 5.391, p < .001)

3.3. Survey D & E: Uncertainty
Experiment D measures the effect of uncertainty regarding the
expected benefits of the bundling of fragmented property entitlements.
Again, each participant (N = 40) was informed that she was one of five
partial-right holders (owners) to a unitary resource. A third-party was
looking to purchase all five parts held by the individual owners. Each
student was informed that each individual part had an objective value of
fifty euros. The aggregate value of the unified bundle was 250 euros. As in
Section 3, we disclosed the opportunity costs of the third party. This time,
however, the subjects were informed that the purchaser faces considerable
uncertainty as to the profitability of the project. Each participant was
requested to state her reservation price in each of five hypothetical
scenarios with varying profits to be obtained by the third-party purchaser
HeinOnline -- 3 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 9 2006-2007
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from bundling all five parts. Additional information was provided as to the
uncertainty of the project's profitability. In four different scenarios,
participants were informed that bundling would create a surplus for the
third party of 100, 500, 1000, or 10,000 euros, each with a probability of
10%. In each of the scenarios, there would be a 90% chance that bundling
did not create any surplus. The expected value of each of these projects
was respectively 10, 50, 100, and 1000 euros. Are the subjects responsive
to the lower expected value generated by the high degree of uncertainty?
Again, the results give rise to pessimism. The results show that subjects
consistently demanded a proportional share of 10% of the maximum profit
that could possibly be realized by bundling. The mean reservation price, set
by one individual right holder, was 14.25% of the surplus (see Fig. 3). Put
differently, the aggregate reservation price was seven times above the
expected value of the project (F(3,37) = 20.31, p < .001).24 Given the
expected benefit of the project (market value of the parts), the gap between
purchaser's willingness to pay and individual owner's willingness to accept
is non-negligible.

30-

CL
i 25Ca

C)
20

00.

oCL

1

-

100

500

I10DD

10000O

surplus under uncertainty (90%)
Figure 3: The expected profit of bundling the fragmentedprope rtyunder a 90% uncertaintyfor the
individual holders. (1F(3,37) = 4.43, p < .01)

24 When there is certainty of 10% of surplus from bundling, every individual holders' maximum
price is 2% of surplus. When individual right holders ask 14.25%, the aggregate price totals seven times
the expected value of the projects. The statistical difference between the 2% case and the observed
reservation prices (F(3,37) = 20.31, p < .001) is significant.
HeinOnline -- 3 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 10 2006-2007
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These results were confirmed in a second similar test (see Figure 4)
when a higher degree of uncertainty is imposed: there is a 99% chance that
bundling does not create any surplus. The expected value of each of these
projects is respectively 1, 5, 10, and 100. Again, the subjects were
unresponsive to the lower expected value generated by the high degree of
From the results, subjects consistently demanded a
uncertainty.
proportional share of 11.44% of the maximum profit. The median price, set
by one individual right holder, was fifty-seven times above the expected
value of the project. The aggregate of the individual right holders'
willingness to accept was fifty-seven times beyond the willingness to pay
price of the purchaser, given the expected benefit of the project.25

25

20

a)

5
0

15

5D

0

C
cl)

0

0J

50

1000

surplus under uncertainty (99%)

Figure 4: The expected profit of bundling thefragmented property under a 99% uncertaintyfor the
individualholders. (F(3,37) = 2.40, p < 0.05)

Again, each subject (N = 78) was informed that he is one of the
partial-right holders to a unitary source and that a third-party was interested
in purchasing all five parts. Each individual part had a value of 50 euros
and when the third-party bundles the five parts, this would generate a
25 A similar deduction can be made as in footnote 21. When there is certainty of 1% of surplus
from bundling, this means that every individual holders' maximum price is 0.2% of surplus. When
individual right holders ask 11.44%, the aggregate price totals fifty-seven times the expected value of
the projects.
HeinOnline -- 3 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 11 2006-2007
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surplus of 125 euros with a probability of 80% and a 20% probability of a
loss of 450 euros. In two different scenarios, students were asked the same
questions, but with a surplus of 1,250 or 12,500 and a loss of 4,500 or
45,000. The expected values of each of these projects were respectively,
10,100, and 1,000 euros. 6

(0
30

o

25

0.

g

020
20

CL

S150)
r- 10ci,
C.,
0

+125/-450

+ 1250/-4500

+12500/-45000

Figure5: The expected profit of bundling the fragmentedpropertyfor the holders undera 80% certainty
of a surplus vs. 20% uncertaintyof losing an amount of money for the purchaser.(F(2,76) =
15.19, p <.001)

Figure 5 confirms the findings of the other experiments. When stakes were
minor, the individual right holders set disproportionately high reservation
prices-35% in the case of a project with expected value of 100 euros (this
totals a combined reservation price of 175% of the expected value of
bundling). When stakes were higher, the average reservation price
remained relatively stable at 14-19% of the expected surplus.
Next, we compared the reservation prices for two types of scenarios.
Although the expected value of bundling was identical in both scenarios,
one scenario promised high returns from bundling, but with great
uncertainty, while the other scenarios promised only a more modest payoff
26 A probability of 80% to win a surplus of 125 euros gives an expected value of 100 euros, while
the chance of loss is 450 euros with a probability of 20%, giving us 90 euros. 100 euros minus 90 euros
gives us an expected benefit of 10 euros.
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to the third-party purchaser, but with higher certainty. In the case where
bundling lead to a 100 dollar surplus with 10% probability, the mean
reservation price was 24% of the expected value, compared to 35% of the
expected value of the low risk-low payoff variant of experiment E (F(2,75)
= 9.44, p < .001). In the case of a 1,000 dollar surplus with 10%
probability in D (high risk-high profit), the mean reservation price was
12%, versus 19% in the low risk-low profit variant of E (F(2,75) = 3.29, p
< .05). In the case of a 10,000 dollar surplus with 10% probability in D
(high risk high payoff), the mean reservation price was 10%, versus 13% in
the low risk-low payoff variant of E (80% chance of +12,500 and 20%
chance of -45,000). Although the expected value in each of these scenarios
was identical, reservation prices seem to be consistently lower (and
cooperation higher) where there was considerable uncertainty regarding
high returns than when there was relative certainty, but with a chance of
losses for the third-party purchaser (See Figure 6, F(2,75) = 4.92, p < .01).
Upon further examination, we find analogous results for instances where
the surplus was 100 euros and 1,000 euros (see Figure 7) under high risk
levels vs. low risk levels (F(2,75) = 10.43, p < .001).
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F(1,76)= 4.13, p < .05

3.4. Survey F
Experiment F was constructed along the lines of the previous surveys.
Again, each subject (N = 62) was informed that she was one of five partialright holders of a unitary resource and that a third party was looking to
purchase all five parts. Every individual part was valued at 50 euros. If the
purchaser was successful at rebundling the five parts, he would obtain a
surplus in a range between a minimum and a maximum expected value. In
a random order, the six trials indicated an expected surplus between
respectively 100-500, 1000-5000 and 10,000-50,000 in the different trials.
This experiment differs from section 3.3. because the exact probability and
payoff from bundling remains unknown. The knowledge of subjects was
restricted to the range within which the profits were situated. This
experiment is more realistic because, as in real-life situations, precise
probabilities remain unknown. For instance, when a real estate developer
seeks to purchase five adjacent tracts, it is more likely that the land owners
base their initial reservation prices on a rough, highly subjective estimate of
the value to the entrepreneur, rather than probability and profit estimates of
the individual provided to subjects in surveys D and E.
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When the surplus was situated in the 100-500 dollar range, the
individual owners demanded 32%, or eighty-three euros, of the average
surplus of 300. The average reservation price was 415 euros. With regard
to the higher profit ranges, the average reservation price was 17.5% of the
average surpluses of 3000 and 30,000. Again, two observations appear.
First, participants employed an all or nothing strategy, demanding relatively
high prices, when stakes were minor.27 Secondly, when stakes were high,
subjects' reservation prices were based on a proportion of the expected
profit of the buyer, irrespective of objective market value of an individual
part.
4.

DIsCUSSION

4.1. Survey A & B: Complementarity
In survey A and B, we measured the magnifying effect of
complementarity of fragmented property entitlements on the occurrence of
anticommons losses.

27 The wider variance within this cell suggests that this finding possibly is a confound resulting
from the low values.
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Prior theoretical research on anticommons fragmentation claims that
the severity of the deadweight losses from concurrent possession of
complementary rights increases monotonically with the number of
independent holders: "The greater the number of individuals who can
independently price an essential input, the higher the equilibrium price that
each of these individuals will demand for his own license. At the margin,
as the number of [right] holders approaches very large numbers (or
infinity), complete abandonment of valuable resources will result."28
While reservation prices for "2 out of 5" complementarity totaled 34%
over the objective value, a case of strict "5 out of 5" complementarity
averaged a combined demand price that was 100% above the objective
value.
These simple findings confirm the theoretical findings that
reservation prices correlate with the strength of veto-right into the
successful bundling of the individual parts.
These basic results of surveys A and B are not surprising. Selling
prices are higher when a seller has more individual bargaining power.
4.2. Survey C: Reservation Prices and the Size of the Pie
Experiment C examined the influence of higher degrees of profitability
on the reservation prices of the individual right holders. Contrary to
surveys A and B, we now disclosed the gains from bundling in order to
measure the effect on reservation prices. Furthermore, we contrasted
situations where reunification of fragmented parts resulted in very
substantial profits with situations where reunification created very modest
gains. The results give little reason to believe that, from the perspective of
uncoordinated selling prices, the problem is less pronounced when
opportunity costs are higher, i.e. when the costs of idleness or under use are
more pronounced.
The results indicate that, with regard to initial
reservation prices, respondents do not discriminate between projects of
rebundling that are very profitable and cases that generate more modest
payoffs. As illustrated in Figure 2 above, there was no significant
difference of reservation prices in the profit range between 300 and 10,000
euros: the average price stated by each of the right holders was
approximately 26% of the total value of the surplus attained by bundling.
In the case of a surplus of 10,000 euros, the purchaser was faced with an
aggregate mean asking price of 12,300 euros. This price was 24.6% above
the price that he could offer so that the project remained profitable.
Similarly, when the profit from bundling was only 300 euros (plot 2 on
graph 2, a median asking price was 26.6% or 79.8 euros per part), the
combined reservation price was 399 euros. Thus, the difference in
reservation prices between a surplus of 300 and 10,000 is non-significant.
28 Depoorter & Parisi, supra note 9,at 460-61.
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The implication is that, in attempting to rebundle subdivided parts, a
third party purchaser faces reservation prices that significantly outweigh the
expected profitability of the attempted reunification, regardless of the size
of the interest at stake. All else being equal, a third party with a highly
profitable project or with a more modest project, faces prices that are, more
or less to the same extent, beyond the expected value of the project. An oil
company seeking to acquire four adjacent parcels of land for the purpose of
optimal drilling, with a potential for efficiency savings of 2 million euros,
faces a negotiation problem comparable to an editor trying to assemble the
copyrights from four different authors for an anthology on American
writing (with profitability of 1000 euros). This confirms the findings of
Libecap and Wiggins that unitization of oil fields, involving multiple right
holders, might fail despite the tremendous gains that can be reaped by
uniting oil fields.29
This survey indicates that subjects hold a certain amount
(approximately 25%) of the profit as a focal point as to what they deem to
be the price at which they are willing to sell their individual part.
Regardless of any endogenous motivation for this proportion (evaluations
of fairness, etc.), five people are each asking a combined price that exceeds
the expected benefits of bundling by 25%.
4.3. Survey D & E: The Role of Uncertainty
Next, we measured the effect of uncertainty regarding the expected
benefits of the bundling of fragmented property entitlements. Surveys D
and E compare conditions: 1) where there was considerable uncertainty
regarding high returns; and 2) where there was relative certainty, but with a
chance of losses for the third-party purchaser. The expected value was
identical in both conditions.
4.3.1. High Degrees of Uncertainty with Large Upside
From the results, it follows that subjects consistently demanded a
proportional share of 10% of the maximum profit that could possibly be
realized by bundling. The mean reservation price, set by one individual
right holder, was 14.25% of the surplus (see Figure 3 above). In our
results, aggregate reservation prices were seven times above the expected
value of the project.
These results indicate that subjects ignored the expected value of the
purchaser's project, and instead focused on the most optimistic outcome of
29 See Gary D. Libecap & Steven N. Wiggins, Contractual Responses to the Common Pool:
Prorationingof Crude Oil Production,74 AM. ECON. REV. 87 (1984).
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the scenario. This expectation leads to higher demands from right holders
than in the previous surveys. Pricing decisions seem to be anchored on the
maximum payoff that the third party purchaser might obtain by bundling,
rather than the expected value of the project. Subjects seem to take the
most positive outcome of bundling as a focal point for the division of
surplus with the purchaser. From the manipulation check, it seems that
respondents were making a conscious choice rather than being confused
about the expected value of bundling.
In the aggregate, however, this is a gloomy outcome. The focus of
right holders on the optimistic outcome of the scenario imposes a heavy
burden on the third party acquirer. The third party will need to negotiate in
order to drive the initial reservation prices down to a price level that is
below 50% of the initial stated price. Prior experimental research has
demonstrated that initial selling prices are sticky, i.e. they influence the
outcome of negotiations." In the advent of these bargaining costs, projects
with uncertainty have a higher chance of failing, by placing such
considerable burden of negotiation on those engaged in high risk projects.
The prospect of such high demands by complementary right holders may
lead projects that involve higher degrees of uncertainty to be forsaken,
despite positive expected values.
These findings are particularly relevant for the domain of patent law.
Intrinsically, the development of medical products from broad inventions
involves a high risk of uncertainty-history has demonstrated that the path
of innovation is unpredictable.3 In this area, substantial investments in
research and development provide no guarantees. When the risk of
research and development is high and is not accounted for in the licensing
prices of upstream patents, medical research may be biased towards lowrisk enterprises.
On a general level, the profits obtained by bundling the individual
parts can be conceptualized as a commons. As individual right holders,
each has a veto right to the third party's project of bundling these resources.
30

Anthony N. Doob et al., Effect Of Initial Selling Price On The Subsequent Sales, 11 J.

PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL., 345-50 (1969). A number of field experiments investigated the effect
of an initial selling price on subsequent sales of common household products. The results are consistent
with dissonance theory in that subsequent sales prices track initial prices.
31 A major historical example of the difficulty of getting an accurate estimation of the expected
value of inventions is IBM's underestimation of the future market of home computers. See Robert P.
Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62
TENN. L. REV. 75, footnote 41 (1994) (citing NATHAN ROSENBERG, EXPLORING THE BLACK BOX:

TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMICS AND HISTORY 220 (1994)): 'The computer was regarded by its inventors as a
purely scientific device . . .' (quoting Barbara G. Katz & Almarin Phillips, The Computer Industry, in
GOVERMENT AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS 162, 171 (Richard R. Nelson ed.,1980)). See also JON
ELSTER,

EXPLAINING TECHNICAL CHANGE 111 (1983); JOEL MOKYR, THE LEVER OF RICHES:
TECHNOLOGICAL CREATIVITY AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 154 (1990); CHRISTOPHER FREEMAN, THE

ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION 75 (2nd ed. 1982).

HeinOnline -- 3 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 18 2006-2007

2006]

PUrrING HUMPTY DUMPTY BACK TOGETHER

As with over-harvesting of common resources, uncertainty about the size of
a commons leads to lower levels of cooperation. In our anticommons
findings, higher degrees of uncertainty regarding the profitability of the
project lead to higher demands by the stakeholders. In the face of these
increasing demands, projects with higher uncertainty (even if they have
identical expected values) are more likely to be forsaken as right holders
demand more on an individual basis, while expecting that others will
demand more. 2 This result aligns with research on common resource
dilemmas where levels of cooperation are reduced when there is more
uncertainty as to the size of the common pool.33
4.3.2. Low Degrees of Uncertainty with Large Downside
Experiment E measures prices under situations where the
purchaser/entrepreneur faced a high probability of modest gains, but there
was also a modest risk of a more substantial loss (low risk-low profit
model).
Although the expected values of each of the several scenarios were
identical, reservation prices were consistently lower in cases with a large
uncertainty regarding the size of the (strictly) positive outcome than in
cases with relative certainty but with a modest chance of a negative
outcome (See Figure6 above). A possible explanation for this result is that
subjects emphasized the relative low probability of success in D over the
possibility of a negative outcome in E.
According to the well-known framing effect,' 4 it is assumed that
individuals adopt different reference points as decision outcomes are
framed differently. Similarly, our results illustrate the influence of the
32

See David V. Budescu & Amnon Rapoport, Generation of Random Binary Series in Strictly

Competitive Games, 29 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC SOC'Y 530 (1985). David Budescu et al., Simultaneous vs.
SequentialRequest in Resource Dilemmas with Incomplete Information, 80 ACTA PSYCHOL. 297 (1992);
David Budescu et al., Common Pool Resource Dilemmas Under Uncertainty: Qualitative Tests of
Equilibrium Solutions, 10 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 171 (1995).
33 Kopelman et al., supra note 12, at 125-27.
34 The prototype of a framing task is the Asian disease problem. Participants are told about an
epidemic of Asian flu, which is expected to kill 600 people in the USA. They then have to choose
between two options: option A saves 200 people with certainty; option B saves all 600 people with
probability p = 1/3 or nobody. Options A and B are framed as gains. Options C and D introduce a
negative framing. By implementing option C, 400 people will die for sure, and by implementing option
D all 600 people will die with probability p = 2/3 or nobody will die. Although each of the options have
an identical expected value (in terms of lives saved), it is attributed to the framing effect that participants
prefer option A (the sure option) over B (the risky option) in the positive framing condition, and prefer
option D (the risky option) over C (the sure option) in the negative framing condition. See Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA
263 (1979); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of
Choice, 211 SC. MAG. 453 (1981).
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communicated frame by the bundler. Although the expected value from
bundling in survey D and E were identical, reservation prices were lower
when the expected value was denoted solely in terms of gains. There are a
number of possible interpretations of this outcome. The results parallel the
findings of de Dreu, et al., that individual right holders are less likely to
make concessions when the payoffs of the third party are conceptualized
from a loss perspective. 5 In our experiment, subjects seem to be more
mindful of uncertainty with regard to gains than losses.36 Put differently, in
considering the price at which they would sell their rights, sellers
disregarded potential losses of the purchaser; however, they seemed more
willing to lower the price to take into account potential profits. The
tendency of right holders to decrease reservation prices when the referenceoutcome was strictly positive, suggests a higher willingness of individual
right holders to cooperate when a project is termed solely in terms of
positive payoffs. Alternatively, the added complexity in the aggregate
calculation of expected values involving positive and negative outcomes
might lead to more exaggerated demands because of the stronger noncalculative nature of collective decision making in those instances.37
5.

CONCLUSION

Over the past three decades, economists, psychologists, philosophers,
and political scientists have conducted intensive research on social
dilemmas. Such research has demonstrated that social dilemmas, such as
public good and prisoner's dilemmas, are very context specific. 8

35

See Carsten K.W. de Dreu et al., Effects of Gain-Loss Frames in Negotiation:Loss Aversion,

Mismatching, and Frame Adoption, 60 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROC. 90
(1994).
36 The adoption of a positive or negative frame has empirically been found to affect the outcome
of dyadic negotiations. Such frames may influence the outcome of further negotiations. For example,
negative framing induces greater risk seeking so that negotiators with a negative frame make fewer
concessions and more often fail to reach agreement than negotiators with a positive frame. Max H.
Bazerman et al., Integrative Bargaining in a Competitive Market, 345 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 294-313 (1985); William P. Bottom & Amy Studt, FramingEffects and the
Distributive Aspects of Integrative Bargaining, 56 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 459 (1993); Margaret A. Neale & Max H. Bazerman, The Effects of Framing and
Negotiation Overconfidence on BargainingBehaviors and Outcomes, 28 ACAD. MGMT. J. 34 (1985).
37 See Peter Colett, The Rules of Conduct, in SOCIAL RULES AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR (Peter Collett
ed., Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1977) (Individuals often seek fast and satisfactory solutions rather than
rational consideration of all choices.).
38 Peter Kollock, Social Dilemmas: The Anatomy of Cooperation, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 183, 185
(1998).
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In this contribution, we addressed the specific elements of
anticommons dilemmas, while deferring the interesting research task of
contrasting commons and anticommons dilemmas.39
The "Tragedy of the Anticommons" is a social dilemma where veto
rights are exercised even when the use of the common resource by one
party could yield net benefits for all parties involved. This experiment
explores how, when a common resource is subject to multiple exclusion
rights held by two or more individuals, these co-owners may withhold these
rights from other users to an inefficient level.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the experiment:
1. Our results confirm the theoretical proposition that anticommons
deadweight losses increase with the degree of complementarity between
individual parts, and with the degree of fragmentation. This paper
illustrates the pricing effect of the anticommons. The results in experiments
A and B clearly show a positive correlation between the amount of the
surplus demanded by the individual property right holders and (i) the
degree of complementarity of individual parts into the buyer's project (A);
and (ii) the number of individual right-holders (B).
2. Individual right holders base their reservation price on a proportion
of the expected surplus of the bundler-purchaser. They disregard the
objective value of the good altogether. In one instance (experiment C), the
purchaser faced five sellers each of who each demanded 25% of the
expected value of his project.
3. In cases of uncertainty, the anticommons dilemma becomes more
pronounced. In experiments D and E, pricing decisions seem to be
anchored on the maximum payoff the third party purchaser might obtain by
bundling, while disregarding the expected value of the project. Subjects
seem to take the best possible result of bundling as a focal point for the
division of surplus with the purchaser. In Experiment D, this focal point
led to a total reservation price that was seven times beyond the expected
value of the project. The extremely high reservation price created a serious
gap between what individual right holders were asking, on the one hand,
and what a third party entrepreneur could reasonably offer.
Another, more subtle response to uncertainty emerges from the
comparison of experiments D and E. When deciding the price at which
they will sell their rights, sellers seem to disregard potential losses of the
purchaser, while they were more willing to take into account uncertainty
with regard to profits. The tendency of the right holders to decrease
reservation prices when the reference-outcome is strictly positive, suggests
39 Elsewhere, we have investigated the empirical and theoretical question on the symmetry
between commons and anticommons dilemmas. See Sven Vanneste et al., From 'Tragedy' to 'Disaster':
Welfare Effects of Commons and Anticommons Dilemmas, 26 INT'L. REV. L. & EcON. 104 (2006)

(Finding that anticommons situations generate greater opportunistic behavior and a greater risk of under
use compared to equivalent commons dilemmas.).
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a higher willingness of individual right-holders to cooperate with projects
termed solely in terms of gains (see Figure6). Subjects seem to emphasize
the relative low probability of success in D over the possibility of losses in
the survey E.
4. When stakes are minor, the individual right holders state
disproportionately high reservation prices-35% in the case of a project
with expected value of 100 euros. Where stakes are higher, the average
reservation price remains relatively stable at 14-19% of the expected
surplus. This all-or-nothing strategy surfaces throughout the various
experiments.

To summarize, our experiment indicates the pricing effect in settings
where complementary units are fragmented over individual right-holders.
Absent price coordination among these right holders, the independent
pricing decisions place a high negotiation burden on a third-party
purchaser.
Our experiment leaves the dynamics of negotiations among
fragmented owners to further research.' However, the results provide a
proxy for the burden of negotiation placed upon the shoulders of a buyer
who seeks to rebundle independently-owned property fragments. The
results also provide an indication of the extent of the price concessions that
a prospective seller will need to obtain to bring the price of bundling within
the limits of the net expected value of bundling. If we assume initial selling
prices are sticky,41 the prospective costs of negotiations might lead to
abandonment of value maximizing projects, leading to the tragic outcome
of under use or idleness.
In this regard, our results reinforce the normative hypothesis of the
anticommons: property right systems should be careful in allowing the

40 See, Robyn M. Dawes et al., Cooperationfor the Benefit of us-Not me, or my conscience, in
BEYOND SELF-INTEREST (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990) (discussing the impact of discussion and
interaction in enhancing cooperation in social dilemmas).
41 When the height of reservation prices is due to the attribution effect, it is likely that price
concessions will be hard to obtain. Cognitive psychology documents peoples' inclination to discount
new evidence that conflict with their prior beliefs (belief perseverance). According to confirmatory
bias, people tend to misconstrue or misinterpret information, so that it becomes additional information
that supports the initial hypothesis. The initial experiments include John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A
Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in Labeling Effects, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.. 20 (1983)
(establishing that identical additional information is interpreted differently because of prior beliefs or
backgrounds); Matthew Rabin & Joel L. Schrag, First Impressions Matter: A Model of Confirmatory
Bias, 114 Q. J. ECON. 37 (1999) (providing a formal model demonstrating how confirmatory bias may
induce overconfidence).
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liberal creation of new property rights and fragmentation of existing
property rights.42

42

See Francesco Parisi, Entropy in Property, 50 AM. J. CoMP. L. 595 (2002).
HeinOnline -- 3 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 23 2006-2007

HeinOnline -- 3 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 24 2006-2007

